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Abstract
Compositionality of programs is an important concern in knowledge representation and
software development. In the context of Logic Programming, up till now, the issue has mostly
been studied for definite programs only. Here, we study compositionality in the context of nor-
mal open logic programming. This is a logic for knowledge representation in the context of un-
certainty and incomplete knowledge on concepts and on problem domain, in which the
compositionality issue turns up very naturally. The semantics of the logic is a generalisation
(allowing non-Herbrand interpretations) of the well-founded semantics. We provide a number
of results which oer dierent sucient conditions under which the models of the composition
of two theories can be related to the intersection of the models of the composing theories. In
particular, under these conditions, logical consequence will be preserved under composi-
tion. Ó 2000 Elsevier Science Inc. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
The compositionality issue arises in a situation where two or more experts coop-
erate to axiomatise a certain domain of application; they have more or less disjunct
subdomains of expertise and they represent their expert knowledges independently in
distinct logical theories. Ideally, once this stage is finished the problem arises how to
combine the knowledge modules in one united theory. In general, there may be dier-
ent modes in which the modules can be composed, but certainly the most important
one seems to take the logical conjunction of their knowledges; i.e. to construct a new
theory which contains exactly the sum of the knowledges of the component modules.
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By the nature of the situation, the modules designed by the experts are incom-
plete representations of the problem domain; they contain uncertainty about the
problem domain. Typically, experts will have two sorts of ignorance in their theo-
ries: ignorance on relations, some of which are defined by the other experts; igno-
rance about the objects some of which are defined by other experts. A suitable
logic to represent knowledge modules should allow the representation of these forms
of uncertainty.
Here, we investigate the compositionality issue in the logic of normal Open Logic
Programs (OLP) and First Order Logic (FOL) [13]. Ref. [13] presents this logic from
a knowledge representation perspective and illustrates its suitability for representing
uncertainty of similar nature as cooperating experts have to face: incomplete know-
ledge on the definitions of certain concepts and on the problem domain.
A theory T in this logic is a pair Td ;Tc of a FOL theory Tc and a normal open
logic program Td , i.e. a set of normal program clauses p  q1; . . . ; qn;:r1; . . . ;:rm.
Normal open logic program will further on also be called logic programs briefly.
Td represents a set of definitions. Predicates occuring in the head of a clause of Td
are called defined. The other predicates, occuring at the most in the body of program
clauses, are called open. Intuitively, they represent concepts for which no definitions
are given. Partial knowledge about these predicates can be expressed in the set of
FOL axioms Tc.
The model semantics of OLP–FOL is an extension of the well-founded semantics
[30] and of the extended well-founded semantics [27] and was defined in Ref. [14].
This logic has a possible state semantics, that is, a model corresponds to a state in
which the problem domain might occur according to the (incomplete) expert know-
ledge (and not a belief set, a set of believed atoms, as in answer set semantics of Ex-
tended Logic Programming). At the level of the semantics, uncertainty on the
definition of a concept is modeled by allowing models which give to the open predi-
cates an arbitrary interpretation which satisfies the set of FOL axioms Tc (and not
e.g. by having truth value unknown for these open predicates as in a belief set seman-
tics). Uncertainty on the level of the domain of discourse (no Domain Closure) is
modeled by allowing general, non-Herbrand models.
Compositionality of logic programs has been investigated by a number of
researchers. We refer to Section 7 for explicit references. In the context of OLP–
FOL, the problem of correct composition of dierent independently designed mod-
ules has a natural formulation which diers from the formalisation as presented in
much of the existing research. Suppose that the logic theory T is obtained by com-
posing the logic theories T1 and T2. In the context of a logic with possible state se-
mantics, the compositionality criterion that the theory T contains precisely the sum
of the knowledges in the modules T1;T2 has a natural formalisation: that the class
of models of T is precisely the intersection of the classes of models of T1 and of T2.
Note that this criterion is the one expressed by the semantics of classical logic con-
junction: models of the conjunction F ^ G of arbitrary FOL formulas F ;G are pre-
cisely the models of F and of G.
Here, we investigate conditions under which the simple union of two OLP–FOL
theories T1;T2 yields a theory which satisfies the natural compositionality criterion.
For a more formal description of the problem investigated, we need the following
notions. The composition of two OLP–FOL theories T1  T1d ;T1c and T2 
T2d ;T2c is defined as the theory T1 [T2  T1d [T2d ;T1c [T2c. Also, given
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a class of interpretations J, the class of members of J which are models of the OLP–
FOL theory T is denoted ModJT. Using these notions, the compositionality
problem considered here is formalised as follows.
• Given is a class J of interpretations, representing a priori knowledge shared by
the experts. In general, this class may be the class of models of a logical theory
representing the a priori knowledge. E.g. this theory can describe knowledge on
the domain of discourse (a Domain Closure Axiom) or simple programming con-
cepts such as definitions of membership of lists, appending of lists, etc.
• Given also is a pair of OLP–FOL theories T1;T2 representing the modules of the
experts with non-intersecting sets of defined predicates.
We investigate conditions on T1;T2 such that:
ModJT1 [T2 ModJT1 \ModJT2:
After Section 2, in which we recall the semantics of OLP–FOL from [14], we give
in Section 3 a first result, stating that for correct theories (this notion is introduced
on p. 7), the class of models of the composition is contained in the intersection of the
classes of models of the two separate theories. In Section 4, by using the notion of
justification, we give a very general condition, the justification condition, on T1
andT2 to obtain the equalityModJT1 [T2 ModJT1 \ModJT2. In Sec-
tion 5, some less general, but syntactical conditions are given; in Section 5.1 we for-
mulate a condition in terms of the dependency relation, in Section 5.1.1 for
propositional theories, in Section 5.1.2 for predicate theories, in Section 5.2, we
study conservative extensions, and in Section 5.3, we study hierarchical and acyclic
programs. In Section 6, we discuss in some more detail the justification condition,
which was introduced in Section 4. We conclude in Section 7 with a discussion on
some related works. A preliminary version of this paper appeared in Ref. [31].
2. The logic OLP–FOL
We assume familiarity with basic concepts of logic and logic programming such as
logical languages L, atoms, literals, (normal) program clauses or rules based on L,
ground instances of rules w.r.t. a language L, 2-valued and 3-valued interpretations,
Herbrand interpretations of L. We refer to Ref. [24]. We assume some familiarity
with the well-founded semantics [30] as well.
We introduce some auxiliary concepts. Each language L is assumed to contain
propositional predicates > and ?; in each interpretation I of L, > is true and ?
is false. HL (or H if L is clear from the context) denotes the class of all Herbrand
interpretations of the language L. Atomic rules are denoted A >. Given a lan-
guage L and an interpretation I with domain D, define the language LD as the ex-
tension of L by adding all elements of D as constants to L. A literal of the form
pd1; . . . ; dn or :pd1; . . . ; dn, where d1; . . . ; dn 2 D is called a fact. For a ground lit-
eral F  pt1; . . . ; tn in LD, ~IF  denotes the fact p~It1; . . . ; ~Itn, where ~I is the
mapping which assigns to each ground term in LD the corresponding domain ele-
ment of the interpretation I . The truth function of I (i.e. the function which maps
positive facts to ff; u; tg) is denoted by HI . We describe a truth function as a set
of tuples of facts with truth value (e.g. fpf ; qu; rtg, meaning that HIp  f;HIq 
u and HIr  t). 2-valued Herbrand interpretations are denoted in the conventional
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notation, as a subset of the Herbrand base. The three truth values are ordered by
f <t u <t t, which is called the truth ordering (dierent from the knowledge ordering
for 3-valued logic, in which u <k t and u <k f). Each truth value has an inverse truth
value: fÿ1  t; tÿ1  f; uÿ1  u.
A theory T in the OLP–FOL logic is a pair Td ;Tc with Td a set of normal
program clauses p  q1; . . . ; qn;:r1; . . . ;:rm (with p; q1; . . . ; qn; r1; . . . ; rm atoms)
and Tc a set of FOL formulas. A predicate p is defined in Td or in T i p occurs
in the head of a rule of Td (it is possible that this rule is of the form
pt1; . . . ; tn  ?). Open predicates are predicates of L which are not defined. An
open logic program Td (or a theory T) is complete if each predicate symbol of L
except equality ; > and ? is defined, otherwise it is incomplete.
The grounding of an open logic program Td w.r.t. a given 3-valued interpretation
I is denoted as GroundITd and is defined as the following set of program clauses:
f~IF   ~IF1; . . . ; ~IFnjF  F1; . . . ; Fn ground instance of a rule in Td in LDg
[fF  >j F is a positive fact of an open predicate and F is true in Ig
Note that the grounding of a complete logic program w.r.t. a Herbrand interpre-
tation corresponds to the conventional notion of the grounding of a logic program.
If Td is incomplete, then the grounding of Td w.r.t. a Herbrand interpretation I
contains in addition all atomic rules of open facts which are true in I .
The semantics of OLP–FOL is based on the concept of justification. A justification
can be seen as a mathematical object justifying the truth value of facts in terms of
truth values of other facts. The basic theorem of this paper, which gives weakest con-
ditions under which two OLP–FOL theories can be composed, uses the concept of
justification. For a detailed discussion we refer to Ref. [14]. The rest of this section
is structured as follows. We define the concepts of justification and justification se-
mantics. We show how the justification semantics is an extension of the well-founded
semantics [30] based on general interpretations.
Below, we denote the complement of a fact F by  F ; i.e. if F is a positive fact,
then  F denotes :F ; vice versa  :F denotes F . We define  > ? and vice versa.
We now define the concepts of elementary justification and justification given an
open logic program Td based on L and an interpretation I of L.
Definition 1 (Elementary justification for a positive defined fact). Given is a positive
defined fact F in I . For any rule F  F1; . . . ; Fn 2 GroundITd we call fF1; . . . ; Fng
an elementary justification for F . If no such ground instance exists for F , then we call
f?g an elementary justification for F .
Each positive defined fact has an elementary justification. Also, an elementary jus-
tification is never empty (recall atomic rules are denoted as A >). An elementary
justification for a positive defined fact is always finite. The concept of an elementary
justification can also be defined for negative defined facts.
Definition 2 (Elementary justification for a negative defined fact). A set J is called an
elementary justification for a negative fact :F of a defined predicate i each
elementary justification J of F contains a fact F 0 such that  F 0 2 J .
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Analogously as for positive facts, each negative fact :F has an elementary justi-
fication and an elementary justification is never empty. It can be infinite.
Definition 3 (Justification). A justification J for F (given Td and I) is a (possibly
infinite) tree of facts with F in the root. Each non-leaf node consists of a defined fact
F 0 such that the set of direct descendants of the node is an elementary justification for
F 0 and no leaf consists of a defined fact.
A branch in a justification J is a maximal sequence of facts F0; F1; . . . with F0 in
the root of J , and each Fi a direct descendant of Fiÿ1 in J . Note that a justification
can have infinite branches and can be infinitely branching. The leaves of a justifica-
tion are >;? or positive or negative open facts. A justification of a fact is always de-
fined w.r.t. a logic program Td . Therefore, when necessary, we explicitly talk about
a justification in Td rather than a justification.
Example 4. Consider a transitive closure program
T1:
trX ; Y   pX ; Y 
trX ; Z  pX ; Y ; trY ; Z
pa; a  >
pb; c  >
8>><>:
In any Herbrand interpretation, the fact tra; b has the following elementary jus-
tifications: fpa; bg, fpa; a; tra; bg, fpa; b; trb; bg, fpa; c; trc; bg. One of the
elementary justifications for the negative fact :tra; b is for instance f:pa; b;
:tra; b; :pa; cg.
In any Herbrand interpretation of T1; tra; b has a unique justification without
?, but it contains an infinite branch of tra; b facts. The negative fact :tra; b has
also a justification without ?. It contains an infinite branch of negative facts
:tra; b.
A positive (resp. negative) loop is a branch with an infinite number of positive
(resp. negative) facts and a finite number of negative (resp. positive) facts. A loop
over negation is a branch with an infinite number of both positive and negative facts.
Next we define the value of a justification as a measure for its success.
Definition 5 (Value of a justification). Let I be an interpretation. Let B be a branch in
a justification. If B is finite and has F as leaf then the value of B under I is the truth
value of F under I . With respect to infinite branches, we define the value of a positive
loop as f, the value of a loop over negation as u and the value of a negative loop as t.
We denote the value of B under I by valIB.
Let J be a justification. The value of J under I is minfvalIBjB is a branch of Jg.
We denote J ’s value by valIJ. J is false, weak, strong under I if valIJ is f; u; t,
respectively.
Note that the minimum of a set of truth values (as it appears in the above defini-
tion), is taken w.r.t. the truth ordering, <t, for 3-valued logic.
The essential idea in the justification semantics is that an interpretation is a justi-
fied model of a logic program Td i for each positive defined fact F , its truth value is
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equal to the value of its most successful justification. We call this value the supported
value of F and denote it by SV Td I ; F . Formally, SV Td I ; F   maxfvalIJjJ is a
justification of F in Tdg (again, this maximum is taken w.r.t. the truth ordering <t).
Definition 6 (Justification semantics). A justified model of a logic program Td is an
interpretation I of L such that for every positive defined fact F
HIF   SV Td I ; F :
Moreover, the interpretation of open predicates is 2-valued.
A justified model of a theory T consisting of a logic program Td and FOL axioms
Tc is a justified model of Td and a model of Tc in the normal FOL sense.
A formula is a consequence of a theory T i it is true in every justified model of
T.
Note that, as in the extended well-founded semantics for abductive logic programs
[27], we insist on 2-valued interpretations for open predicates. This requirement is
indispensable to reason on uncertainty. As an example, consider the following open
logic program, representing that one is dead i one is not alive
dead  :alive
The predicate alive is open. One conclusion that one wants to draw from this
program is that dead_alive, where _ denotes exclusive disjunction. This program
has two justified models faliveg and fdeadg. In both models, the exclusive dis-
junction holds. However, if the truth value of alive would be allowed to be u,
then also dead would be u, and the desired conclusion would not longer be
entailed.
More in general, it is indispensable that open predicates have a 2-valued interpre-
tation in order to maintain reasoning by cases as a sound reasoning principle. Ref.
[26] has argued that this form of reasoning is essential for reasoning on uncertainty.
This he illustrates with a simple example. Three blocks, a, b and c are arranged as
shown:
The colour of a is green, c is blue and the colour of b is unknown. A desired con-
clusion is that there is a green block adjacent to a non-green block, a conclusion
which can be easily derived by a reasoning by two cases. In a 3-valued setting in
which the color of b could be undefined, the intended conclusion would not be de-
rivable. 3
This raises the question why we allow 3-valued interpretations for the defined
predicates. An open logic program Td is interpreted as a definition of the defined
predicates in terms of open predicates. As argued more extensively in Refs.
3 For a representation of this problem in OLP–FOL, we refer to Ref. [13].
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[14,13], the role of 3-valuedness is to pinpoint local ambiguities in these definitions.
Or, the occurrence of an undefined fact in a model of Td reveals an ambiguity in the
definition. This motivates the following definition.
Definition 7 (Correct theory). Given is an open logic program Td and a class of
interpretations J. Then Td is called a correct definition (or correct) w.r.t. J i each
model of Td which belongs to J is 2-valued. A theory T  Td ;Tc is correct
w.r.t. J i Td is a correct definition w.r.t. J.
In case J is the class of all interpretations, we simply call T correct. In the sequel,
we will focuss mostly on correct theories and hence to those cases with a 2-valued
semantics. Note that the notion of correctness only makes sense for 3-valued seman-
tics, and not for instance for the stable semantics [18]. In the following, justified mod-
els of a theory will also be called models briefly.
We extend the notion of supported value to open facts and negative facts. The
supported value under I of an open fact F is defined as HIF . The supported value
under I of a negative defined fact F can be defined analogously as for positive facts:
it is equal to the value of the best justification of F . The following theorem (see
Ref. [12], Theorem 4.3.1) asserts that a fact and its negation have inverse supported
values.
Theorem 8 (A fact and its negation have inverse supported values). Let Td be a logic
program, I an interpretation and F a fact. Then
SV Td I ; F   SV Td I ; F ÿ1:
A direct consequence of this theorem is that in a model the truth value of negative
facts is also equal to their supported value. This restores the asymmetry between pos-
itive and negative facts in the definition of model, which requires only that positive
facts have truth value equal to their supported value.
Theorem 9 (see Ref. [14], Theorem 3.1) asserts that each logic program is consis-
tent w.r.t. the justification semantics. We call a pre-interpretation together with a
truth function which is defined only on some subset of the set of predicates, an in-
complete interpretation for the specified predicates.
Theorem 9 (Consistency theorem). Given is a logic program Td and an incomplete 2-
valued interpretation I for the open predicates of L only. Then there exists a unique
justified model of Td extending I .
Example 10 illustrates the dierence between complete and incomplete knowledge
in a theory.
Example 10. Theory T1 of Example 4 is complete and hence has only one justified
Herbrand interpretation, namely fpa; a; pb; c; tra; a; trb; cg (enumeration of
the true positive facts, i.e. the positive facts which have a strong justification). Note
that T1 has also non-Herbrand models.
Now, suppose there is no complete knowledge about the predicate p. We only
know that 9X : pX ;X . So the theory we consider is
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T2:
trX ; Y   pX ; Y 
trX ; Z  pX ; Y ; trY ; Z
9X : pX ;X  FOL axiom
8<:
Then the leaves of a justification of a tr-fact can, besides > and ?, also con-
tain a p-fact (p is an open predicate). Theory T2 has several Herbrand models.
Each 2-valued interpretation of the open predicate p, which satisfies the FOL
axiom 9X : pX ;X , gives rise to a justified model of the theory. For instance,
the interpretation of p; fpa; a; pb; cg, gives rise to the model
fpa; a; pb; c; tra; a; trb; cg (which was the unique justified Herbrand mod-
el of theory T1). But also the interpretation of p; fpb; bg, satisfies the FOL ax-
iom and hence gives rise to a justified model of the theory, namely the model
fpb; b; trb; bg.
The semantics of the OLP-FOL logic is an extension of well-founded semantics
[30] based on general interpretations. Well-founded semantics can be easily lifted
to general interpretations by using the notion of grounding w.r.t. a given 3-valued
interpretation. Theorem 11 gives an alternative characterisation of the model seman-
tics of OLP–FOL. This theorem is a trivial extension of results proven in Ref. [14]
(Theorem 4.3).
Theorem 11 (Alternative characterisation of the justification semantics). An interpre-
tation M is a justified model of an open logic program Td i M is a well-founded model
[30] of the grounding of Td w.r.t. M .
An interpretation M is a justified model of an OLP–FOL theory T  Td ;Tc i
M is a well-founded model [30] of the grounding of Td w.r.t. M and M satisfies Tc in
the normal FOL sense.
Since the grounding of a complete logic program Td w.r.t. a Herbrand interpre-
tation corresponds to the conventional notion of the grounding of a logic program, it
trivially follows that the justified Herbrand model of a complete logic program is the
well-founded model [30]. Also, a justified Herbrand model of an incomplete logic
program is an extended well-founded model [27]. Note that for a complete and cor-
rect logic program Td , the (unique) justified Herbrand model is the well-founded
model [30] which is 2-valued, and hence it is equal to the unique stable model [18]
of Td ([1], Corollary 7.8). Note that the converse is not true. That is, if a program
has a unique stable model, the well-founded model can be 3-valued. See for instance
the following classical example.
Td :
p  :q
q  :p
q  :q
8<:
Td has only one stable model, namely fpf ; qtg and the well-founded model,
fpu; qug, is 3-valued.
With ModT we will denote the class of (justified) models of a theory T. If J is
a class of interpretations, then ModJT denotes the class of (justified) models of T
which belong to J (i.e. ModJT ModT \J).
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3. No loss of information
Given is a first order language L and two theories T1  T1d ;T1c and T2 
T2d ;T2c based on L. We will suppose, for the rest of the paper, that T1 and
T2 define disjunct sets of predicates. Then all the predicate symbols of L defined
in T1 (resp. T2) are open in T2 (resp. T1). Recall that the predicate symbols of
L not defined in T1 or T2 are open in T1 and T2. Denote the union of T1 and
T2 by T1 [T2  T1d [T2d ;T1c [T2c (where [ is just the normal union of sets;
Tid a set of clauses, Tic a set of FOL axioms, i 2 f1; 2g).
The crucial question in this paper is the following: ‘When are the consequences of
T1 [T2 exactly those formulas which are true in all the interpretations which are
model of T1 and of T2?’. Since a formula is a consequence of a theory i it is true
in every model of the theory, we can reformulate this question in terms of models:
‘When is ModT1 [T2 ModT1 \ModT2?’. The equality doesn’t always
hold, as is shown by the following example.
Example 12. Consider the following two propositional theories T1 and T2.
T1 : alive not dead
T2 : not dead  alive
Because not dead is open in T1;T1 has two models, I1  fnot dead t; alivetg
and I2  fnot dead f ; alivefg. T2 has the same two models (alive is open in
T2). But only the interpretation I2 is a model of T1 [T2. We see that
:alive and :not dead are consequences of the union T1 [T2, whereas it is
not the case that they are true in every interpretation which is a model of
T1 and of T2.
In Section 4 we give some conditions on the theories T1 and T2, so that the
equality ModT1 [T2 ModT1 \ModT2 holds. But generally, for correct
theories, T1;T2 and T1 [T2, the inclusion ModT1 [T2 ModT1 \
ModT2 already holds. This means that formulas which are true in every interpr-
etation which is a model of T1 and T2 are consequences of T1 [T2 (but it is pos-
sible that T1 [T2 has more consequences, see Example 12). Before giving this
result, we show in Example 13 that it is not always the case that the union of two
correct theories is correct.
Example 13. Let T1 and T2 be the following theories.
T1 : alive :dead
T2 : dead  :alive
It is easy to see that ModT1 ModT2  ffdead f ; alivetg; fdead t; alivefgg.
So, T1 and T2 have only 2-valued models. But T1 [T2 has a unique model which
is 3-valued, namely fdeadu; aliveug.
Also the converse does not hold. If we know that T1 [T2 is a correct theory, we
cannot conclude that T1 and T2 are correct.
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Example 14. Consider the theories T1 and T2.
T1:
dead  :alive;:dancing
alive  :dead

T2: dancingf  >
T1 [T2 has only one model (which is 2-valued), stating that dancing and alive
are true and dead is false. The predicate dancing is open in T1, so if we assume that
dancing is false, we get the 3-valued model of T1 in which dead and alive have truth
value u.
Theorem 15 (No loss of information). Given two theoriesT1 andT2 such thatT1;T2
and T1 [T2 are correct. Then ModT1 [T2 ModT1 \ModT2.
Proof. Suppose M is a model of T1 [T2. We prove that M is a model of T1. Since
M is a model of the FOL axiomsT1c [T2c, M is a model ofT1c. We prove that M is
a justified model of T1d .
Let F be a fact. Suppose that F is open in T1. Then HMF   SV T1d M ; F  by
definition and M is 2-valued.
Suppose that F is defined in T1. We first assume that HMF   t. Because M is a
justified model of T1d [T2d , SV T1d[T2d M ; F  HMF . So there exists a justifica-
tion J for F in T1d [T2d such that valMJ  t. This means that every branch of J
has value t. Let J1 be the justification for F in T1d obtained from J by cutting o
every branch after its first fact defined in T2. Then it is easy to see that valMJ1  t
and SV T1d M ; F   t HMF .
If HMF   f, then HM F   t and by the previous we know that
SV T1d M ; F   t. By Theorem 8 SV T1d M ; F   f, hence SV T1d M ; F  HMF .

Example 13 shows that if for instance T1 [T2 is not correct, the inclusion does
not hold anymore.
Note that the result in Theorem 15 holds for the justification semantics. If we con-
sider for instance the stable semantics, the result in Theorem 15 does not hold (just
take Example 13).
Recall that we made the assumption that each predicate symbol is defined in at
most one theory T1 or T2. This assumption is necessary, as is made clear by the fol-
lowing example.
Example 16. Consider the following two theories T1 and T2. Note that they both
define alive.
T1:
not dead  alive
alive  not dead

T2: alivef  >
T1 has only one model in which both alive and not dead are false. When adding a
second rule for alive (stating that alive is always true), we get another unique model
in which alive and not dead are true.
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For some theories we are only interested in certain classes of interpretations, like
for instance Herbrand interpretations. In this case, we have the following result,
which is a generalisation of Theorem 15.
Theorem 17 (No loss of information, generalisation). Given a class of interpretations
J and two theories T1 and T2 such that T1;T2 and T1 [T2 are correct w.r.t. J.
Then ModJT1 [T2 ModJT1 \ModJT2.
Proof. The proof is analogous to the proof of Theorem 15. We now start with a
model of T1 [T2 which belongs to J. 
In Example 18, two theories, T1 and T2, are given. They define the even-, respec-
tively the odd-, relation for natural numbers. Only Herbrand interpretations are rel-
evant for these theories. We show that we can apply Theorem 17, with J H, and
that we cannot apply Theorem 15.
Example 18. Consider the following two theories T1 and T2. The theory T1 defines
the predicate even=1 in terms of the predicate odd=1 and the theory T2 defines the
predicate odd=1 in terms of the predicate even=1.
T1:
even0  >
evenssX   :oddX 

T2:
odds0  >
oddssX   :evenX 

It is easily seen that T1 and T2 are correct. But T1 [T2 has a 3-valued (non-
Herbrand) model. Indeed, let J0 be the pre-interpretation with domain the disjunct
union N [ Z, the interpretation of 0 (constant) 0 2 N and the interpretation of s=1
the union of the successor functions on the natural numbers and on the integers. De-
fine the interpretation I with pre-interpretation J0 as follows: the interpretation of
even=1 is
even2
n
 nt; even2 n 1f j n 2 N
o
[ evenzu j z 2 Zf g
and the interpretation of odd=1 is
odd2
n
 nf ; odd2 n 1t j n 2 N
o
[ oddzu j z 2 Zf g:
Then I is a 3-valued model of T1 [T2. It is obvious though, that only Herbrand
interpretations are relevant w.r.t. this theory, and it is clear that T1 [T2 has only
2-valued Herbrand models. In fact, there is only one, namely
evens2n0; odds2n10 j n 2 N 	:
Hence, T1, T2 and T1 [T2 are correct w.r.t. H. Applying Theorem 17, with
J H, gives us the inclusion
ModHT1 [T2 ModHT1 \ModHT2:
As we will see later (Theorem 28), there’s actually an equality here.
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4. The justification condition
The aim of this section is to provide a general condition onT1 andT2, so that the
equality
ModT1 [T2 ModT1 \ ModT2 
holds, or equivalently, so that the consequences of T1 [T2 are exactly those formu-
las which are true in every interpretation which is a model of T1 and of T2. We first
give some motivating examples.
4.1. Motivating examples
In the first example the predicates defined in T2 are all ‘new’, that is, they do not
occur in T1d .
Example 19. Consider the following two theories defining some family relationships.
T1:
parentX ; Y   fatherX ; Y 
parentX ; Y   motherX ; Y 
fathera; b  >
motherb; c  >
8>><>:
T2:
ancX ; Y   parentX ; Y 
ancX ; Y   ancX ; Z; parentZ; Y 

The first theory T1 defines the predicate parent=2 in terms of the predicate
father=2 and mother=2, for which there are given some facts. The second theory
T2 defines the predicate anc=2 in terms of itself and parent=2.
In this case the equality  holds. Looking for instance at Herbrand interpreta-
tions, we see that the only Herbrand interpretation which is a model of T1 and of
T2 is the interpretation I  ffathera; b; motherb; c; parenta; b; parentb; c;
anca; b; ancb; c; anca; cg. It is easily seen that I is the unique Herbrand model
of T1 [T2.
Next we give an example in which clauses of T2 have predicates in their body
which are defined in T1, and vice versa (hence, there is a kind of mutual dependency
between T1 and T2). In this example the equality  doesn’t hold, and we have a
strict inclusion.
Example 20. Let T1 and T2 be the following theories.
T1:
parentX   fatherX 
parentX   motherX 

T2:
fatherX   parentX ; maleX 
motherX   parentX ; femaleX 
malea  >
8<:
In T1 parent=1 is defined in terms of father=1 and mother=1, while in T2 father=1
and mother=1 are defined in terms of parent=1.
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The Herbrand interpretation I  fmalea; parenta; fatherag is a model of
both T1 and T2, but it is not a model of T1 [T2. The only Herbrand model of
T1 [T2 is I 0  fmaleag.
Example 20 suggests that the condition to be put on T1 and T2 to obtain the
equality  is that only ‘new’ predicates (i.e. predicates not occuring in T1d) can
be defined in T2. This condition is surely sucient (see Theorem 35 in Section 5.2),
but is not necessary, as is shown by the following example.
Example 21. Let T1 and T2 be the following theories.
T1: grparX ; Y f  parentX ; Z; parentZ; Y 
T2:
gr grparX ; Y   grparX ; Z; parentZ; Y 
parenta; b  >
parentb; c  >
parentc; d  >
8>><>:
T2 defines gr grpar=2 in terms of grpar=2 and parent=2, and grpar=2 is defined in
T1 in terms of parent=2, which is defined in T2.
The equality  holds. For instance, the only Herbrand interpretation which is a
model of T1 and of T2 is fparenta; b; parentb; c; parentc; d; grpara; c;
grparb; d; gr grpara; dg, and this is the unique Herbrand model of T1 [T2.
Comparing the last two examples, we see that in Example 20 the dependency be-
tween the defined predicates inT1 and the defined predicates inT2 is an ‘infinite’ one:
parent=1 T1 is defined in terms of father=1 T2,
father=1 T2 is defined in terms of parent=1 T1,
parent=1 T1 is defined in terms of father=1 T2; . . .
Whereas in Example 21, the dependency is a ‘finite’ one:
gr grpar=2 T2 is defined in terms of grpar=2 T1,
grpar=2 T1 is defined in terms of parent=2 T2,
parent=2 T2 is defined totally in T2.
A condition in terms of dependency relations is discussed in the next sections. We
now give an example which requires a more general condition. The equality 
holds, although the dependency between the defined predicates inT1 and the defined
predicates in T2 is an infinite one.
Example 22. Consider the following two propositional theories.
T1:
dead  :alive; :dancing
dancing FOL axiom

T2: falive :dead
The predicates dead T1 and alive T2 depend on each other.
But the equality ModT1 [T2 ModT1 \ModT2 holds. Indeed, the
intersection of ModT1 and ModT2 consists of one interpretation
fdancingt; alivet; dead fg, which is the only model of T1 [T2.
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In Event Calculus [22,29], there is a broad class of examples for which, like Exam-
ple 22, the equality  holds although there is an infinite kind of dependency be-
tween the defined predicates in T1 and the defined predicates in T2. These
examples require a more general condition. In the following section we define the jus-
tification condition, which subsumes all the following conditions given in Section 5.
We will also give an example in a sort of Event Calculus to illustrate the justification
condition.
4.2. The justification condition
For a justification in T1 [T2, an infinite branch with an infinite number of facts
defined in T1 and an infinite number of facts defined in T2, is called an infinitely
switching branch between T1 and T2.
Definition 23 (Justification condition). Two theories T1 and T2 satisfy the
justification condition i the following condition is satisfied for all interpretations I
which are model of the FOL axioms T1c [T2c. For each fact F , if there is a
justification of F in T1d [T2d with only true leaves under I (or no leaves) and an
infinitely switching branch between T1 and T2, then there is a strong justification of
F in T1d [T2d under I .
The justification condition is clearly not a syntactical condition; it is undecidable
(justification of finite depth is undecidable). The justification condition is however a
very general condition, from which many other conditions can be deduced (see for
instance Proposition 30, or all the syntactical conditions in Section 5).
Now we are able to give the main theorem.
Theorem 24 (Main theorem). Given two correct theories T1 and T2. If T1 and T2
satisfy the justification condition, then
ModT1 [T2 ModT1 \ModT2:
For the proof of Theorem 24 we first need the following lemma.
Lemma 25. Given two correct theories T1 and T2 and a model M of T1 [T2. Let F
be a fact of a predicate defined inT1 (resp. T2) with HMF   u. Then there is a weak
justification of F in T1 (resp. T2) with a leaf G defined in T2 (resp. T1) and
HMG  u.
Proof. Suppose that, given the conditions, the conclusion of the lemma doesn’t hold.
Then for every justification J of F in T1 with value u, the facts defined in T2
occuring as leaf of J have value t. Consider the incomplete interpretation M 00 on the
facts open in T1, with the same pre-interpretation as M and truth function HM 0
0
on
the open facts in T1 defined as follows: HM 0
0
HM on the facts open in T1 [T2
and on the facts G defined in T2 with HMG 6 u, and HM 0
0
G  t on the other
facts G defined in T2. Hence M 00 is 2-valued on the facts open in T1 and HM 00 HM
on the facts defined in T2 occuring as leaf in the justifications of F in T1 with value
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u. Then there is a unique interpretation M 0 extending M 00 to all the facts such that M
0
is a justified model of T1d (Theorem 9). By the construction of M 00 and M
0 it is clear
that SV T1M 0; F   SV T1[T2M ; F   u, hence HM 0 F   u.
It is sucient to prove that M 0 is a model of the FOL axioms T1c. Indeed,
this gives a contradiction with the assumption that T1 has only 2-valued mod-
els. We proof that M is F -weaker than M 0 (M 6 F M 0, i.e. for each positive fact
G which is true or false according to M , HMG HM 0 G). Then, because M
is a model of T1c, M 0 is a model of T1c (we can prove by induction on the
structure of an axiom u that if u is t or f according to M , HMu HM 0 u).
Given a fact G. If G is open in T1 and HMG is t or f, then HMG 
HM 0 G by construction of M 0. Suppose G is defined in T1 and HMG  t.
Then there is a justification J of G in T1 [T2 with all branches true under
M . Let J1 be the justification of G in T1 obtained from J by cutting o every
branch after his first fact defined in T2. Then every branch of J1 has value t
under M . Because, concerning the facts open in T1, we already have that M is
F-weaker than M 0, every branch of J1 is true under M 0. Hence, SV T1M 0;G  t
and HM 0 G  t HMG. If HMG  f, then HM G  t and by the pre-
vious SV T1M 0; G  t. By Theorem 8 SV T1M 0;G  f and HM 0 G  f 
HMG. This concludes the proof of the lemma. 
Proof of Theorem 24. To prove the inclusion ModT1 [T2 Mod T1 \
ModT2, it is sucient to prove, by Theorem 15, that each model of T1 [T2 is
2-valued. Let M be a model of T1 [T2 and assume there is a fact F (defined in T1)
with HMF   u. Applying the previous lemma, there is a justification J1 of F in T1
with valMJ1  u and there is a leaf G of J1, defined in T2, withHMG  u. We can
extend J1 by adhering to each true leaf, defined in T2, a strong justification in
T1 [T2 (there exists one because M is a model of T1 [T2) and by adhering to
each unknown leaf (like G) a weak justification J2 in T2 (there exists one according
to the previous lemma). We can repeat this process (on G and J2 instead of F and J1)
and because of the lemma it will not stop. Hence, there exists an interpretation (M),
model of T1c [T2c, and there is a fact (F ) which has a justification with only true
leaves and an infinite branch with an infinite number of facts defined in T1 and an
infinite number of facts defined in T2 and F has no strong justification. This
contradicts the justification condition, so HMF   u is impossible and the first
inclusion is proved.
To prove the other inclusion, let M be a model of T1 and of T2. By the mono-
tonicity of FOL it is clear that M is a model of T1c [T2c. To prove that M is a jus-
tified model of T1d [T2d , we take a fact F and prove that
SV T1[T2M ; F  HMF . This is clear when F is open in T1 [T2 (note that M
is 2-valued). Suppose F is defined in T1 (analogously for T2) and HMF   t. Be-
causeHMF   SV T1M ; F , there exists a strong justification J1 of F inT1, i.e. with
every branch value t. Extending J1, we are going to build a justification J of F in
T1 [T2. We do this by adhering to each leaf of J1 which is a defined fact in T2
a strong justification in T2 (there exists one because the leaves have truth value t
and M is a model of T2). We repeat this process. If it stops, we obtain a strong jus-
tification of F in T1 [T2 and hence SV T1[T2M ; F  HMF   t. If it doesn’t
stop, there is an interpretation (M), model of T1c [T2c, a fact (F ) and a justification
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of F in T1 [T2 with only true leaves and an infinite branch with an infinite number
of facts defined in T1 and an infinite number of facts defined in T2. Because of the
justification condition F has a strong justification in T1 [T2. Hence,
SV T1[T2M ; F  HMF   t. Suppose next that HMF   f. Then HM F   t
and by the previous we know that SV T1[T2M ; F   t. By Theorem 8,
SV T1[T2M ; F   f and hence SV T1[T2M ; F  HMF . This concludes the proof
of the theorem. 
Theorem 24 implies that if T1 and T2 are correct and if they satisfy the justifica-
tion condition, then T1 [T2 is also correct.
Example 26. Reconsider Example 18 of the previous section. The theories T1 and
T2 do not satisfy the justification condition. Indeed, for each interpretation with
pre-interpretation J0 the justification of a fact evenz (analogously oddz), z 2 Z, is
an infinite branch with infinitely many facts defined in T1 (the even-facts) and
infinitely many facts defined in T2 (the odd-facts), and there is no justification for
evenz (analogously for oddz) with value t.
As was already shown in Example 18 the only model of T1 [T2 with pre-inter-
pretation J0 is 3-valued and the equality  does not hold.
But, as we mentioned before, the only interpretations that really matter here are
the Herbrand interpretations. Looking at Herbrand interpretations only, we can see
that every justification of a fact is finite. Hence, for Herbrand interpretations the jus-
tification condition is satisfied and it holds that ModHT1 [T2 
ModHT1 \ModHT2.
These observations lead to the following definition and theorem.
Definition 27 (Justification condition, generalisation). Given a class of interpretations
J. Two theories T1 and T2 satisfy the justification condition w.r.t. J i the
following condition is satisfied for all interpretations I in J which are model of the
FOL axioms T1c [T2c. For each fact F , if there is a justification of F in T1d [T2d
with only true leaves under I (or no leaves) and an infinitely switching branch
between T1 and T2, then there is a strong justification of F in T1d [T2d under I .
WhenJ is the class of all interpretations, we simply get the justification condition as
stated in Definition 23. The next theorem uses this concept to generalise Theorem 24.
Theorem 28 (Main theorem, generalisation). Given a class of interpretations J and
two theories T1 and T2 correct w.r.t. J. If T1 and T2 satisfy the justification
condition w.r.t. J, then
ModJT1 [T2 ModJT1 \ ModJT2:
Proof. The proof is analogous to the proof of Theorem 24. We now consider only
interpretations of J. 
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Hence, if T1 and T2 are correct w.r.t. J and if they satisfy the justification con-
dition w.r.t. J, then T1 [T2 is correct w.r.t. J. The theories T1 and T2 of Exam-
ple 26 satisfy the conditions of Theorem 28 with J H.
We will now give an example similar to Event Calculus [22,29].
Example 29. Suppose we have a situation in which there is a lamp and a switch. The
lamp can be on or o at a certain time. When the lamp is on and we turn the switch,
the lamp will be o and vice versa. The lamp is on (resp. o) at a certain time T if
there is an event E before T on which the lamp was o (resp. on) and on which there
was a switch and such that there were no switches between E and T . It is given that
the lamp is o at a certain time 0.
T1:
onT   switchE; E < T ; off E;
:switchturnE; T 
switchturnE; T   switchE1; E < E1; E1 < T
8<:
T2:
off T   switchE; E < T ; onE;
:switchturnE; T 
off 0  >
8<:
A first expert defines the predicate on=1 in terms of the predicate off =1, of which
he has no knowledge, resulting in the theory T1. A second expert defines the pred-
icate off =1 in terms of the predicate on=1, of which he has no knowledge, resulting in
the theory T2. We would like to know if the union of these two theories contains
exactly the sum of the knowledges of the two experts. In particular, we would like
to know if the equality
ModT1 [T2 ModT1 \ModT2
holds. This is not the case. Consider for instance the class of interpretations F with
domain R (the real numbers), the interpretation of the constant 0, 0 2 R, the inter-
pretation of the open predicate < =2 the ‘smaller than’ relation on the real numbers
and the interpretation of the open predicate switch=1
switchzt j z 2 Z 	 [ switchrf j r 2 Rn ÿ Zo:
Consider the interpretation I in F with the interpretation of switchturn=2:
switchturnr; st j r; s 2 R; r < s; 9z 2 Z: z 2r; s	
and all the other switchturn-facts false, the interpretation of on=1:
onrt j r 2 R; 9z 2 Z: 2z < r6 2z 1	
and all the other on-facts false and the interpretations of off =1:
off rt j r 2 R; 9z 2 Z: 2z ÿ 1 < r6 2z	
and all the other off -facts false. Then I is a model of T1 and of T2. But I is not a
model of the union T1 [T2. Indeed, the only interpretation in F which is a model
of T1 [T2 assigns to all facts onr and off r, with r < 0, truth value f (every jus-
tification inT1 [T2 of these facts has a positive loop consisting of on- and off -facts).
Now suppose that both experts have the following a priori knowledge, represent-
ed by the class J of all interpretations in which this a priori knowledge is true. The
experts both know that the domain is R (the positive real numbers), the interpretat-
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ion of the constant 0 is 0 2 R, the interpretation of the open predicate < =2 is the
‘‘smaller than’’ relation on the positive real numbers and they both have complete
knowledge about the open predicate switch=1
switchnt j n 2 D 	 [ switchrf j r 2 Rn ÿ Do;
where D is a fixed subset of N, modelling the fact that at each natural number of D
there is a switch. D can be for instance N or a finite subset of the natural numbers.
Then T1; T2 satisfy the justification condition w.r.t. J. Indeed, take an arbitrary
interpretation in J. It is obvious that all justifications of the switchturn-facts in T1 [
T2 are finite. We now take a closer look at the justifications in T1 [T2 of the on-
facts (analogously for the off -facts). The justifications of an on-fact, ont (t 2 R),
with only true leaves are always finite. This is because, starting from a given t 2 R,
each elementary justification of ont is of the form fswitche; e < t; off e;
:switchturne; tg. The fact switche is true only if e 2 D. The fact e < t is true
only if e is taken smaller than t. Hence, in a justification of ont with only true
leaves, e < t and e 2 D. We can then repeat the same reasoning for the fact
off e. Hence, we see that the depth of a justification of ont with only true leaves
must be equal or smaller than ]fe j e < t and e 2 Dg. Because D  N, this is a
finite number.
By applying Theorem 28 (note that T1 and T2 are correct w.r.t. J) we get
ModJT1 [T2 ModJT1 \ModJT2:
Intersecting ModJT1 and ModJT2, we obtain only one interpretation.
Suppose for instance that D  fn0  0; n1; n2; . . .g  N, with ni < ni1, for all
i 2 N. The unique interpretation of ModJT1 [T2 is given as follows: the true
on-facts are given by
fonr j n2i < r6 n2i1 and i 2 Ng
(all the other on-facts are false) and the true off -facts are given by
foff r j n2i1 < r6 n2i1 and i 2 Ng [ foff 0g
(and all the other off -facts are false).
The following is an easy corollary to Theorem 28.
Proposition 30 (Condition in terms of justifications). Given a class of interpretations
J and two theories T1 and T2 correct w.r.t. J. If for each interpretation in J, which
is a model of the FOL axioms T1c [T2c, it holds that for every fact F , F or  F has a
strong justification of finite depth in T1d [T2d , then
ModJT1 [T2 ModJT1 \ ModJT2:
Proof. Suppose that for each interpretation in J and for every fact F it holds that F
or  F has a strong justification of finite depth in T1d [T2d . We prove that
T1d ;T2d satisfy the justification condition. Then the proposition is a direct
consequence of Theorem 28. Suppose there is an interpretation I in J and a fact F
which has a justification J1 inT1d [T2d with only true leaves (or no leaves) and with
an infinite branch with an infinite number of facts defined in T1d and an infinite
number of facts defined in T2d and suppose F has no strong justification in
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T1d [T2d . We prove that this is impossible. Because F has no strong justification in
T1d [T2d ,  F has a strong justification J2 of finite depth in T1d [T2d . By the
definition of justification, there is a branch B1 in J1 and a branch B2 in J2 such that
B1  B2. But this means that B1 has a false leaf, which gives a contradiction. 
Note that the theories T1 and T2 of Example 29 satisfy also the conditions of
Proposition 30 w.r.t. the class of interpretations J (as defined in Example 29).
In Section 5 we introduce some stronger, but syntactical conditions on the theo-
ries T1 and T2 such that  still holds. A more detailed discussion on the justifica-
tion condition will be given in Section 6.
5. Some syntactical conditions
5.1. Condition in terms of dependency relation
First, in Section 5.1.1, we restrict ourselves to propositional theories, based on a
propositional language L. In Section 5.1.2 we extend to the predicate case again.
5.1.1. Propositional theories
Given a propositional languageL and a theoryT  Td ; Tc based onL, let 
denote the dependency relation on the proposition symbols of T. Recall that the
dependency relation is the transitive closure of the relation 1, with p 1 q if there’s
a clause in Td with head p, and q or :q in the body. If p  q, we say that p depends
on q.
We now introduce a condition on the propositional theories T1 and T2 in terms
of this dependency relation. The next theorem states that if T1 and T2 satisfy this
condition, the equality  holds.
Theorem 31 (Condition in terms of dependency relation, propositional theories).
Given a propositional language L and two correct theories T1 and T2 based on L.
Consider the dependency relation  on the proposition symbols of T1 [T2. If for each
descending sequence K of proposition symbols, there is an i 2 f1; 2g such that the
proposition symbols defined in Ti appear only finitely many times in the sequence K,
then ModT1 [T2 ModT1 \ModT2.
Proof. It is clear by the definition of a justification (Definition 3) that if T1 and T2
satisfy the condition of the theorem, there are no justifications in T1d [T2d with an
infinite branch with an infinite number of facts defined in T1 and an infinite number
of facts defined in T2. Hence, by the definition of justification condition (Definition
23), T1 and T2 satisfy the justification condition. The theorem follows then from
Theorem 24. 
The condition given in Theorem 31 is sucient, but not necessary, as was shown
in Example 22. Note that Theorem 31 can also be applied in the case of an infinite
propositional program (the proof of Theorem 24 considers possibly infinite ground-
ings of theories w.r.t. an interpretation). If L consists of a finite number of
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proposition symbols, the condition in Theorem 31, can alternatively be formulated
as follows: for each cycle C of proposition symbols, there is an i 2 f1; 2g such that
all proposition symbols in C are defined in Ti.
5.1.2. Predicate theories
We return to the case of a first order language L and two theories T1 and T2
based on L.
When we only want to consider Herbrand interpretations, we can use the result of
the previous Section 5.1.1. Let GroundT1 [T2 denote the grounding of T1 [T2
(i.e. of the logic program part and of the FOL axioms) w.r.t. the Herbrand universe.
We assume that for each ground atom p of a defined predicate symbol such that no
ground instantiation of a clause has p in the head, the grounding contains the rule
p  ?.
Theorem 32 (Condition in terms of dependency relation, predicate theories and
Herbrand models). Given two theories T1 and T2 which are correct w.r.t. H.
Consider the dependency relation  on the ground atoms of GroundT1 [T2. If for
each descending sequence K of ground atoms, there is an i 2 f1; 2g such that the ground
atoms defined in Ti appear only finitely many times in the sequence K, then
ModHT1 [T2 ModHT1 \ModHT2.
Proof. The grounding of a theory can be treated as a propositional program
(possibly an infinite one). This theorem is then a direct consequence of Theorem
31. 
If T1 and T2 are correct w.r.t. H and satisfy the condition of Theorem 32, then
T1 [T2 is also correct w.r.t. H.
Sometimes it is not enough to consider only Herbrand interpretations. For this
reason, let’s define in the usual way the dependency relation  on the predicate sym-
bols ofT1 [T2. Analogously as in the previous section (see Theorem 31), we obtain
the following result.
Theorem 33 (Condition in terms of dependency relation, predicate theories). Given a
class of interpretations J and two theories T1 and T2 correct w.r.t. J. Consider the
dependency relation on the predicate symbols of T1 [T2. If for each descending
sequence K of predicate symbols there is an i 2 f1; 2g such that the predicate symbols
defined in Ti appear only finitely many times in the sequence K, then
ModJT1 [T2 ModJT1 \ModJT2.
Hence T1 [T2 is also correct w.r.t. J. Note that in case of a finite number of
predicate symbols (which is the normal case), the condition in Theorem 33 can alter-
natively be formulated as follows: for each cycle C of predicate symbols there is an i 2
f1; 2g such that all predicate symbols in C are defined in Ti.
Examples 19 and 21 of Section 4 satisfy the conditions of Theorem 33, with J the
class of all interpretations, whereas Example 20 does not. We give another nice
example.
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Example 34. Let T1 and T2 be the following theories defining the predicates even=1
and odd=1.
T1:
even0  >
evensX   oddX 

T2: oddsX f  evenX 
First note that the equality ModT1 [T2 ModT1 \ModT2 does not
hold. Indeed, consider the 2-valued non-Herbrand interpretation I with pre-interpre-
tation J0 (see Example 18), the interpretation of even=1
even2
n
 nt; even2 n 1f j n 2 N
o
[ evenzt j z 2 Z 	
and the interpretation of odd=1
odd2
n
 nf ; odd2 n 1t j n 2 N
o
[ oddzt j z 2 Z 	:
Then I is a non-Herbrand model of T1 and of T2. But I is not a model of
T1 [T2, because the only model of T1 [T2 with pre-interpretation J0 assigns
truth value f to all facts evenz; oddz with z 2 Z.
But again, the only interpretations which are important w.r.t. these theories are
the Herbrand interpretations. And for these interpretations the equality holds, i.e.
ModHT1 [T2 ModHT1 \ModHT2:
To prove this, we take the grounding of T1 [T2:
even0  >
evens0  odd0
  
evensn10  oddsn0
  
odd0  ?
odds0  even0
  
oddsn10  evensn0
  
Then it is easy to check that T1 and T2 satisfy the conditions of Theorem 32 (ev-
ery descending sequence of ground atoms of T1 [T2 is finite). It is also easy to see
that T1 [T2 has a unique 2-valued Herbrand model given by
evens2n0; odds2n10 j n 2 N 	:
Note that we cannot apply Theorem 33 (with J H) to obtain the same result,
because T1 and T2 do not satisfy the conditions of that theorem: there is an infinite
descending sequence
even=1  odd=1  even=1    
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with even=1 defined in T1 and odd=1 in T2.
In the following two subsections of this section we give some stronger, syntactical
conditions on T1 and T2 to obtain .
5.2. Conservative extensions
We first need some notation. Given a theory T  Td ; Tc. Let HeadTd de-
note the set of all predicate symbols occuring in the head of a clause of Td . Let
PredTd denote the set of all predicate symbols occuring in Td . The following theo-
rem is a direct consequence of Theorem 33.
Theorem 35 (Conservative extensions). Given a class of interpretations J and two
theories T1 and T2 correct w.r.t. J. If HeadT2d \ PredT1d  ;, then
ModJT1 [T2 ModJT1 \ModJT2.
The condition HeadT2d \ PredT1d  ;means that only predicate symbols not
occuring in T1d can be defined in T2d . Hence, predicate symbols defined in T1d can-
not depend on predicate symbols defined in T2d (the converse is possible though).
An example was given in Section 4, Example 19.
Under the conditions of Theorem 35, we are given a way to construct every model
of T1 [T2 by successively finding a model of T1 and T2. Let us be more precise.
Suppose two correct logic programs T1d and T2d are given and T1d does not refer
to the predicate symbols defined in T2d . Suppose T1d [T2d is complete. Because
T1d does not refer to predicates defined in T2d , every predicate occuring in T1d is
also defined in T1d . Given a pre-interpretation J , denote the set of models of T1d
with pre-interpretation J by MJ . It is clear that each model in MJ has the same truth
function on predicate symbols defined in T1d . In the set MJ there is exactly one in-
terpretation M which is also a model of T2d . Because of the equality, ModT1d [
T2d ModT1d \ModT2d; M is a model of T1d [T2d and every model of
T1d [T2d can be obtained in this way. If T1d [T2d is incomplete, then, instead
of starting with a given pre-interpretation only, we also fix a 2-valued truth function
on the predicate symbols open in T1d [T2d and then repeat the same reasoning.
The reasoning remains valid when adding FOL axiomsT1c andT2c to the logic pro-
grams. This is because of the monotonicity of FOL; not satisfying T1c or T2c is
equivalent with not satisfying T1c [T2c.
In a way, the logic program Td T1d [T2d is split into two parts. In Ref. [23]
Lifschitz and Turner discuss this idea of splitting a logic program in the context of
answer set semantics for disjunctive logic programs with classical negation. They call
T1d the bottom of Td and T2d the top of Td .
A corollary to Theorem 35 is a property which is in literature often called the con-
servative extension property. If we extend an initial correct logic program T1d by a
correct logic program T2d , which gives only definitions for ‘new’ predicate symbols
(i.e. not occuring inT1d), then for every formula u, consisting only of predicate sym-
bols defined in T1d , u is a consequence of T1d if and only if u is a consequence of
T1d [T2d . This can be proven by induction on the length of the formula u, using
Theorem 35.
172 S. Verbaeten et al. / J. Logic Programming 42 (2000) 151–183
Conservative extensions were studied by Lifschitz and Turner in the context of
disjunctive logic programming with classical negation [23], by Gelfond and Przymu-
sinska in the context of extended logic programming [20] and in the context of epis-
temic specifications [19].
A notion which is strongly related to the conservative extension property, is Rele-
vance (goal-directed computation), studied in Ref. [4] for disjunctive logic program-
ming semantics. Roughly speaking, a semantics satisfies Relevance, if the truth value
of a set M of atoms is completely determined by the clauses which are relevant w.r.t.
M . A clause is relevant w.r.t. M if it contains an atom B in the head such that an at-
om A of M depends on B. The notion of Relevance is shown to be strongly related to
Independence and Consistency, also considered in that paper (see Ref. [4], Lemma
2.1).
5.3. Hierarchical and acyclic programs
The last results concern hierarchical and acyclic programs. For more details about
these kinds of programs, see Refs. [2,24]. We just give their definitions.
Definition 36 (Hierarchical logic program). A logic program Td is hierarchical if there
exists a mapping j j from PredTd to the natural numbers such that for every clause
pt1; . . . ; tn  L1; . . . ; Lm in Td , jpj is greater than the value under j j of each
predicate symbol occuring (positively or negatively) in the body.
It is obvious that hierarchical programs cannot have 3-valued models and that
each subset of clauses of a hierarchical program is itself hierarchical.
Proposition 37 (Correctness of hierarchical programs). Given a theory T  Td ;Tc
with Td a hierarchical logic program. Then T is correct.
Proposition 38 (Subset of hierarchical program is hierarchical). Given a hierarchical
logic program Td . Then every Td 0 Td is hierarchical.
Combining these propositions together with Theorem 33, with J the class of all
interpretations, gives us the following theorem.
Theorem 39 (Splitting a hierarchical program). Given a theory T  Td ; Tc with
Td a hierarchical logic program. Then for every T1  T1d ; T1c and T2 
T2d ; T2c such that T T1 [T2 (and such that every predicate is defined in at
most one theory, either T1 or T2), the equality ModT ModT1 \ModT2
holds.
Using induction, we can extend this theorem to split a hierarchical theory into a
finite number of theories. We refer to the very similar case of acyclic programs below
for an example of how this is done.
When only Herbrand interpretations are relevant w.r.t. the theory, we can put a
more general, syntactical restriction on the theory.
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Definition 40 (Acyclic logic program). A logic program Td is acyclic if there exists a
mapping j j from the Herbrand base to the natural numbers such that for every
clause A B1; . . . ;Bm;:Bm1; . . . ;:Bn in GroundTd; jAj > jBij for every 16 i6 n.
Analogously to the case of hierarchical programs, the following properties hold.
Proposition 41 (Correctness of acyclic programs w.r.t. set of Herbrand interpretat-
ions). Given a theory T  Td ; Tc with Td an acyclic logic program. Then T is
correct w.r.t. H.
Proposition 42 (Subset of acyclic program is acyclic). Given an acyclic logic program
Td . Then every Td 0 Td is acyclic.
And as a result of these two propositions and Theorem 32 we get:
Theorem 43 (Splitting an acyclic program). Given a theory T  Td ; Tc with Td
an acyclic logic program. Then for every T1  T1d ; T1c and T2  T2d ; T2c
such that T T1 [T2 (and such that every predicate is defined in at most one theory,
either T1 or T2), the equality ModHT ModHT1 \ModHT2 holds.
Again, we can extend this theorem to split T into a finite number of theories.
Example 44. Consider again the theories T1 and T2 of Example 34. Let T3 be the
theory defining the natural numbers.
T1:
even0  >
evensX   oddX 

T2: oddsX f  evenX 
T3:
natX   evenX 
natX   oddX 

It is clear that T1 [T2 [T3 is acyclic. Indeed, consider the mapping j j,
jevensn0j  n;
joddsn0j  n;
jnatsn0j  n 1
with n 2 N and s00  0. Then for every clause in GroundT1 [T2 [T3 the value
under j j of the head is greater than the value of the atom in the body.
The intersection of ModHT1; ModHT2 and ModHT3 gives us the unique
Herbrand model of T1 [T2 [T3
evens2n0; odds2n10; natsn0 j n 2 N 	:
Note that these theorems (Theorems 39 and 43) do not hold for stratified or lo-
cally stratified programs. This was illustrated by Example 12.
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6. Discussion
The justification condition (introduced in Section 4, Definition 27) on two theo-
ries T1; T2, to obtain the equality
ModJT1 [T2 ModJT1 \ModJT2 
is not a necessary condition. That is, there are theories T1 and T2, for which the
above equality holds, but which do not satisfy the justification condition. We give
an example.
Example 45. Consider the following propositional theories.
T1: p  q; :q
T2: q p; :p
Then it is easy to see that ModT1  ffpf ; qtg; fpf ; qfgg and ModT2 
ffpt; qfg; fpf ; qfgg. Hence, ModT1 \ModT2  ffpf ; qfgg and this is also
the only model of T1 [T2: the equality ModT1 [T2 ModT1 \ModT2
holds.
But T1; T2 do not satisfy the justification condition. We see that p (and by sym-
metry also q) has a justification in T1 [T2 with all branches infinite and each
branch containing an infinite number of p=:p-facts and an infinite number of
q=:q-facts (in fact, all justifications of p have this property) and p has no strong jus-
tification in T1 [T2.
The underlying diculty for finding a necessary and sucient condition on two
theories to obtain the equality  is the fact that the truth value u is treated in a
dierent way as the other truth values t and f: a model of a theory is always 2-valued
on the open predicates, that is, a model cannot assign truth value u to an open predi-
cate. This restriction on models of a theory is a very important one, as we already
noted in the remark after Definition 6 of justified models. In the following of this sec-
tion, we show that, if we drop this restriction (and obtain the notion of justified in-
terpretations as opposed to justified models), we can find a necessary and sucient
condition to obtain an equality between the class of justified interpretations of the
union of two theories and the intersection of the classes of the justified interpreta-
tions of the separate theories. This is because, if this restriction (open predicates can-
not have truth value u in a model) is dropped, the three truth values are treated in a
more or less similar way. By introducing the notion of justified interpretation (see
Definition 46), we can give a better insight in the underlying diculty for finding
a necessary and sucient condition to obtain the equality , but it is important
to note that the meaning of a logic theory is given by its set of justified models,
and not by its set of justified interpretations.
Definition 46 (Justified interpretation of a theory). A justified interpretation of a logic
program Td is an interpretation I of L such that for every positive defined fact F
HIF   SV Td I ; F :
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A justified interpretation of a theory T consisting of a logic program Td and FOL
axioms Tc is a justified interpretation of Td and a model of Tc in the normal FOL
sense.
Note that a justified interpretation of a theory can be 3-valued on the open
predicates and it is this property that makes the dierence between justified in-
terpretations and justified models. Let JIntT denote the class of all justified
interpretations of a theory T. For a class of interpretations J, let JIntJT 
JIntT \J. Let MT denote the class of interpretations which is 2-valued on
the open predicates of the theory T, then ModJT  JIntJT \MT. A first
result concerning the justified interpretations of the union of two theories is the fol-
lowing proposition.
Proposition 47. Given are two theories T1; T2 and a class of interpretations J. Then
JIntJT1 [T2  JIntJT1 \JIntJT2.
Proof. Let M 2 JIntJT1 [T2. We prove that M is a justified interpretation
of T1 (analogously of T2). Let F be a fact, then we have to prove that
HMF   SV T1M ; F . By Theorem 8 it is sucient to prove that
HMF 6 SV T1M ; F . Suppose F is defined in T1 (otherwise trivial).
Suppose HMF   t. Then F has a strong justification J in T1 [T2. We obtain a
justification J1 in T1 by cutting o every branch of J after its first fact defined in T2
(if it has one). Then valMJ  t and SV T1M ; F   t. Suppose HMF   f. It is tri-
vial that for each SV T1M ; F ; HMF   f6 SV T1M ; F .
Suppose next that HMF   u. Then there is a weak justification J of F in
T1 [T2. By cutting o every branch of J after its first fact defined in T2 (if it
has one), we obtain a justification J1 of F in T1 with valMJ1P u. Hence,
SV T1M ; F PHMF   u. 
The converse does not hold as is shown in Example 48.
Example 48. Reconsider the theories of Example 12.
T1: alive not dead;
T2: not dead  alive
We see thatJIntT1  JIntT2  ffalivet; not dead tg; faliveu; not deadug;
falivef ; not dead fgg, whereas JIntT1 [T2  ffalivef ; not dead fgg.
Proposition 47 has the following two corollaries.
Corollary 49. The 2-valued models of T1 [T2 are (2-valued) models of T1 and of T2.
Proof. By Proposition 47, the inclusion JIntJT1 [T2  JIntJT1 \
JIntJT2 holds. Intersecting both sides of the inclusion with the class of all 2-
valued interpretations, we obtain that all 2-valued models of the union T1 [T2 are
model of T1 and of T2. 
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Corollary 50. If T1 [T2 is correct w.r.t. J, then ModJT1 [T2
ModJT1 \ModJT2.
Proof. If T1 [T2 is correct w.r.t. J, then all models of T1 [T2 are 2-valued and
Corollary 49 can be applied. 
Corollary 50 gives us Theorem 17 of Section 3.
Next, we give a necessary and sucient condition on two theories T1; T2 such
that the equality JIntJT1 [T2  JIntJT1 \JIntJT2 holds.
By a looping justification, we mean a justification with a positive loop or with a
loop over negation.
Definition 51 (Justification condition for justified interpretations). Given are two
theories T1; T2 and a class of interpretations J. T1 and T2 satisfy the justification
condition for justified interpretations w.r.t. J if for each justified interpretation of T1
and of T2 in J, the following holds.
– for each true fact F :
if F has a looping justification in T1 [T2 such that
 each leaf is true,
 each positive loop or loop over negation has an infinite number of facts de-
fined in T1 and an infinite number of facts defined in T2,
then F has a strong justification in T1 [T2;
– for each unknown fact F :
if F has a looping false justification in T1 [T2 such that
 each leaf is true or unknown,
 each positive loop has an infinite number of facts defined in T1 and an infi-
nite number of facts defined in T2,
then F has a weak justification in T1 [T2.
Theorem 52 (Necessary and sucient condition for justified interpretations). Given
are two theories T1;T2 and a class of interpretations J.
T1 and T2 satisfy the justification condition for justified interpretations w:r:t: J
iff
JIntJT1 [T2  JIntJT1 \JIntJT2:
Proof. If we know the equality holds, we prove that T1; T2 satisfy the justification
condition for justified interpretations w.r.t. J. Let M be a justified interpretation of
T1 and of T2 in J. Because of the equality, M is a justified interpretation of
T1 [T2 and thus, each true fact has a strong justification in T1 [T2 and each
unknown fact has a weak justification in T1 [T2. Hence T1; T2 satisfy the
justification condition for justified interpretations w.r.t. J. To prove the converse,
note first that the inclusion JIntJT1 [T2  JIntJT1 \JIntJT2 holds in
general (Proposition 47). Let M be a justified interpretation of T1 and of T2 in J.
We prove that M 2 JIntJT1 [T2. It is already clear that M satisfies the set of
FOL axioms T1c [T2c. Let F be a fact, then we prove that HMF  
SV T1[T2M ; F . By Theorem 8, it is sucient to prove that HMF 6
SV T1[T2M ; F . We may assume that F is defined in T1 (analogously for T2 and
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trivial when F is open in T1 [T2). Suppose first that HMF   t. Because
HMF   SV T1M ; F , there is a strong justification J1 of F in T1. There are three
possible kinds of branches in J1: a negative loop in T1, a finite branch with a true
leaf H , open in T1 [T2 and a finite branch with a true leaf G, defined in T2. We
extend the tree J1 by applying the same reasoning on the leaves G of branches of the
last kind (and with T1 replaced by T2). Suppose this process stops (i.e. after a finite
number of steps all the leaves of the tree obtained so far are open in T1 [T2). Then
we obtain a tree which is a strong justification of F inT1 [T2. If the process doesn’t
stop, there are two possible cases to be considered. When the constructed (infinite)
tree contains no positive loop or loop over negation with an infinite number of facts
defined in T1 and an infinite number of facts defined in T2, then the tree is a strong
justification of F in T1 [T2. Otherwise, because of the justification condition for
justified interpretations, F has a strong justification in T1 [T2. In the two cases,
SV T1[T2M ; F   t6HMF   t. Suppose next that HMF   f. Then it is obvious
that HMF   f6 SV T1[T2M ; F . Finally, suppose that HMF   u. We prove that
SV T1[T2M ; F   t or u. There is a weak justification J1 of F in T1. There are six
possible kinds of branches of J1: an infinite branch which is a negative loop or a loop
over negation in T1, a finite branch with a leaf H , open inT1 [T2, with value t or u
or a finite branch with a leaf G, defined in T2, with value t or u. For each leaf G,
defined in T2, of a branch with value t, there is, according to the previous reasoning,
a strong justification in T1 [T2. Hence, we can adhere a strong justification in
T1 [T2 to those leaves. Next we apply the same reasoning (as for F , defined in T1)
on leaves G, defined in T2, with value u. Suppose this process stops. Then we obtain
a weak justification of F in T1 [T2 and hence SV T1[T2M ; F P u. If the process
doesn’t stop, there are three possible cases to be considered. The obtained infinite
tree is a false justification of F in T1 [T2. Because of the justification condition for
justified interpretations, there is a weak justification of F in T1 [T2, hence
SV T1[T2M ; F P u. When the obtained tree is a weak or strong justification of F in
T1 [T2, we immediately have that SV T1[T2M ; F P u. This concludes the proof.

We now return to Example 45 of the beginning of this section.
Example 53. Recall the theories T1 and T2 of Example 45.
T1: q p; :p
T2: p  q; :q
As we already saw, the equality for the models, ModT1 [T2 
ModT1 \ModT2, holds.
ModT1  pt; qf
 	
; pf ; qf
 	 	
ModT2  pf ; qt
 	
; pf ; qf
 	 	
ModT1 [T2  pf ; qf
 	 	
:
But the equality for the justified interpretations, JIntT1 [T2  JIntT1\
JIntT2, does not hold. Indeed,
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JIntT1  pt; qf
 	
; pf ; qf
 	
; pu; quf g 	
JIntT2  pf ; qt
 	
; pf ; qf
 	
; pu; quf g 	
JIntT1 [T2  pf ; qf
 	 	
:
This is equivalent with saying thatT1; T2 don’t satisfy the justification condition
for justified interpretations (Theorem 52). If we take the justified interpretation
fpu; qug of T1 and of T2 and the unknown fact p, we see that p has a looping false
justification in T1 [T2 with no leaves and each positive loop has an infinite number
of facts defined in T1 q, and an infinite number of facts defined in T2 p, but p
has no weak justification in T1 [T2.
7. Related works
Prior to composing the logical modules of cooperating K.R.-experts, the indivi-
dual experts face the problem of representing their incomplete knowledge as logical
modules. Therefore, we believe that the suitability of a logic for modular knowledge
representation depends in the first place on its expressivity for representing incom-
plete knowledge. This study investigates the compositionality problem in the context
of a knowledge representation logic, OLP–FOL, designed as an extension of logic
programming for non-monotonic knowledge representation in the context of uncer-
tainty [13].
In some studies in modular logic programming, e.g. [9,5], compositionality of the
logic is seen as a first rank requirement; the semantics of the (syntactical) composi-
tion of modules is required to be the result of a semantical composition operator on
the semantics of the modules. The semantic composition operator under study here
is the logical conjunction operator. In a logic with a possible state semantics (as for
OLP–FOL), this composition operator can be naturally defined by the intersection
on the classes of models. As was observed first in Ref. [28], compositionality
(w.r.t. logical conjunction) and non-monotonicity are contradictory requirements.
More precisely, when a syntactic composition operator is compositional w.r.t. the
logical conjunction operator, this syntactic composition operator is monotonic.
However, a monotonic logic is not very suitable for knowledge representation.
The syntactic composition operator in OLP–FOL is not always compositional and
it should not be.
As opposed to most of the works about compositionality, this paper considers
logic programs which may contain negation in the body of their clauses. In Sec-
tion 5.2 we mentioned three works [23,20,19] which also allow negation. Other ex-
ceptions which also consider negation are [17,28,10]. However, either they consider
a weaker compositional semantics based on completion semantics [28], or the re-
sults are restricted either to hierarchical dependencies between modules, as in
Ref. [17], or to the case of one module representing a conservative extension of an-
other module [10]. We discuss these three works in more detail. In Ref. [17], they
consider programs with import predicates (called units); import predicates corres-
pond to open predicates in our approach. An abstract semantics for units is a func-
tion taking in input a set of imported literals and producing another set of literals.
They present conservative extensions of the well-founded and Fitting’s semantics.
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These semantics are proved to be compositional w.r.t. union of units, i.e. the se-
mantics of the union can be deduced from the semantics of the components. In
case of the extension of the well-founded semantics this is only stated if the system
of units is hierarchical, that is to say that there is no circular dependency between
the units. Although they use a very dierent terminology and their set-up is dier-
ent, their approach leans closest to ours. In Ref. [28] a compositional semantics
(which can be seen as a compositional counterpart of Kunen’s semantics) for nor-
mal programs based on a first order completion of the program is defined. Defini-
tions which are not explicitly given in the program are not closed and hence those
predicates remain open, which is needed in a modular context. Their semantics is
compositional while remaining non-monotonic to a certain extent. In essence, the
semantics is compositional and monotonic on the level of composition of modules,
while addition of clauses to modules remains a non-monotonic operation. In
Ref. [10] a compositional semantics for logic programs is defined which handles in-
consistencies locally instead of globally. This semantics fulfills the following com-
position requirement stating that the meaning of a program P is not modified if
P is extended with a program Q such that none of the atoms defined in P are also
defined in Q and no definitions in P depend on atoms defined in Q (the program Q
is in fact a conservative extension of the program P ). In Ref. [15], Dix already
introduced this notion of compositionality, which he called modularity, in order
to classify several semantics of disjunctive logic programs. For normal programs,
Dix investigated this notion and its interaction with other conditions at length in
Ref. [16].
By allowing predicates to be open in a logic program, we deal with incomplete
knowledge on predicates. In Ref. [17] import predicates are introduced to repre-
sent this kind of incomplete knowledge. In Refs. [9,8] they work with a dierent
notion of open predicates to capture the possible composition with other pro-
grams. In their semantics of admissible Herbrand models, predicates occuring
in the body of a clause of the program are considered as open. Roughly speaking,
a Herbrand model M of a program P is admissible if there exists a set of open
atoms (admissible hypotheses) H such that all the atoms in M are logical conse-
quences of P [ H . In Ref. [7] this semantics is extended to normal logic programs
by transforming them to open positive programs. Their semantics of admissible
Herbrand models is suited for compositionality problems, but seems less suitable
for knowledge representation. For example, it is unclear to us how to represent
the concept of transitive closure in admissible Herbrand semantics. Consider
the well-known transitive closure program, defining the transitive closure tr=2
of a predicate p=2.
pa; b  >
trX ; Y   pX ; Y 
trX ; Z  pX ; Y ; trY ; Z
8<:
This program has one intended Herbrand model, namely fpa; b; tra; bg, which
is the unique justified Herbrand model (both predicates p=2 and tr=2 are defined).
However, it has many unintended admissible Herbrand models, e.g. the model
fpa; b; tra; b; trb; a; tra; a; trb; bg, which is admissible under the set
ftrb; ag of hypotheses. As a consequence, the semantics assigned by admissible
Herbrand semantics to this program is much weaker than the intended one.
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A special place in the compositionality research is taken by Ref. [5]. Rather
than modelling the meaning of a program by a class of Tarskian models, repre-
senting the possible states of the world, or by belief sets as in Extended Logic
Programming, each definite program is denoted by its immediate consequence op-
erator TP . The union of two definite programs can be proven to correspond to a
certain operation on the corresponding TP operators. The result is a highly ab-
stract sort of semantics of a program, which allows [5] the introduction of many
dierent composition operators, all in terms of dierent ways of composing the TP
operators of the distinct modules. In comparison, we investigate only one opera-
tor, namely the operator which joins the knowledge of the modules. Recently, the
algebraic approach of Ref. [5] was extended for normal logic programs [6] using
Fittings 3-valued completion operator.
In Ref. [3] the problem of modelling the composition by union of definite pro-
grams is studied, by considering computed answer substitution as observable behav-
iour of programs (instead of the more standard notion of success set). To capture
this notion of behaviour, programs are denoted by programs (obtained through un-
folding) rather than by Herbrand models. The OR-compositional (i.e. compositional
w.r.t. program union) semantics of open programs they define, corresponds to a pro-
gram equivalence notion, according to which two programs P1 and P2 are equivalent
i for any program Q, P1 [ Q and P2 [ Q give the same computed answer
substitutions.
Besides uncertainty on predicates, one can also have incomplete knowledge
on the domain of discourse. By considering general interpretations, like in
Ref. [28], we take into account this kind of incomplete knowledge. Other ap-
proaches either do not model this kind of incomplete knowledge or model it
by allowing Herbrand interpretations of arbitrary extensions of the module lan-
guage.
In the previous discussed approaches and also in our approach, module com-
position is seen as a metalinguistic mechanism. Another main direction in the re-
search of compositionality of logic programming formalisms is of a linguistic
nature and is seen for instance in Refs. [25,21]. They extend the formalism of
Horn clause logic with modal operators in order to provide a richer support
for modular programming. In Ref. [21], they show that (multi)modal logics are
well-suited for supporting the notion of module. Each module is given a name
and for each module a modal operator is introduced. A modal characterisation
is given for the situation in which the meaning of modules does not depend on
the external environment (and on other modules) except for explicit importations.
They also give some hints on how this modal characterisation can be used to cap-
ture the notions of inheritance between modules, of operations on modules such
as union or how it can be used to define programs with several modules each one
with its own internal language. All this oers lots of possibilities, which are worth
investigating further.
For a survey of dierent kinds of approaches to modularity, we refer to Ref. [11].
Finally, we would like to mention some problems related to program composition
that were not considered in this work. Among them, parametrised modules, several
experts designing definitions for the same concepts, several experts overloading the
same predicate symbol to represent dierent concepts. These are topics for future
work.
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